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Twelve years ago, when I was chief economist of the World Bank, I suggested that
the major challenge to development economics was learning the lessons of the
previous several decades: a small group of countries, mostly in Asia, but a few in
other regions, had had phenomenal success, beyond anything that had been
anticipated by economists; while many other countries had experienced slow
growth, or even worse, stagnation and decline—inconsistent with the standard
models in economics which predicted convergence. The successful countries had
followed policies that were markedly different from those of the Washington
Consensus, though they shared some elements in common; those policies had not
brought high growth, stability, or poverty reduction. Shortly after I left the World
Bank, the crisis in Argentina—which had been held up as the poster child of the
country that had followed Washington Consensus policies—reinforced the doubts
about that strategy.
The global financial crisis, too, has cast doubt over the neoclassical paradigm
in advanced industrial countries, and rightly so. Much of development economics
had been viewed as asking how developing countries could successfully transition
toward the kinds of market-oriented policy frameworks that came to be called
“American style capitalism.” The debate was not about the goal, but the path to
that goal, with some advocating “shock therapy,” while others focused on pacing
and sequencing—a more gradualist tack. The global financial crisis has now
raised questions about that model even for developed countries.
In this short essay, I want to argue that the long-term experiences in growth
and stability of both developed and less developed countries, as well as the deeper
theoretical understanding of the strengths and limitations of market economies,
provide support for a “new structural” approach to development—an approach
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similar in some ways to that advocated by Justin Lin in his paper, but markedly
different in others. This approach sees the limitations of markets as being greater
than he suggests—even well functioning market economies are, on their own,
neither efficient nor stable. The only period in the history of modern capitalism
when there has not been repeated financial crises was the short period after the
Great Depression when the major countries around the world adopted, and
enforced, strong financial regulations. Interestingly this was also a period of rapid
growth and a period in which the fruits of that growth were widely shared.
But government not only has a restraining role; it has a constructive and cata-
lytic role—in promoting entrepreneurship, providing the social and physical infra-
structure, ensuring access to education and finance, and supporting technology
and innovation.
The perspective that I am putting forward differs not only in its view of the effi-
ciency and stability of unfettered markets, but also in what it sees as the primary
driver of economic growth. Since Solow’s pioneering work more than a half-
century ago (Solow 1957), it has been recognized that the major source of
increases in per capita income are advances in technology.1
The argument that improvements in knowledge are a primary source of
growth is even more compelling for developing countries. As the World
Development Report for 1998–99 emphasized, what separates developing and
developed countries is not just a gap in resources, but a disparity in knowledge.
There are well understood limits to the pace with which countries can accumulate
capital, but the limitations on the speed with which the gap in knowledge can be
closed are less clear.
But the view that creating a learning society, focusing on absorbing and adapt-
ing, and eventually producing knowledge, provides markedly different perspectives
on development strategies than those provided by the neoclassical model. That
model centered attention on increasing capital and the efficient allocation of
resources. Since the appropriate sectoral structure of the economy naturally
depends on the resource endowment, there will be a natural evolution of the
economy’s structure over time. Markets allocate resources efficiently, enabling the
structure to change as the (endogenous) endowments change. A government’s
main role, in this view, is not to put impediments in the market.
The standard market failures approach criticized these conclusions by focusing
on a variety of market imperfections: For instance, imperfections in capital
markets meant that finance was often not available for new enterprises that were
required as part of this sectoral adjustment. Individuals on their own couldn’t
finance their education. There are pervasive externalities—not only environ-
mental externalities but also those associated with systemic risk, so evidenced in
the current crisis. Research over the past 20 years has explored the consequences
of market failures like imperfect capital markets, traced these imperfections back
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to problems of imperfect and asymmetric information, and proposed a set of reme-
dies, which in some countries, in some periods, have worked remarkably well.
Good financial regulations in countries like India protected them against the
ravages of the global financial crisis.
But the perspective of the “learning society”—or, as Greenwald and I call it,
the “infant economy”—adds a new dimension to the analysis (Greenwald and
Stiglitz 2006). Knowledge is different from an ordinary commodity. The accumu-
lation of knowledge is inherently associated with externalities—knowledge spil-
lovers. Knowledge itself is a public good. If the accumulation, absorption,
adaptation, production, and transfer of knowledge are at the center of successful
development, then there is no presumption that markets, on their own, will lead
to successful outcomes. Indeed there is a presumption that they will not.
The “new structuralist approach” advocated by Justin Lin is perfectly aligned
with this perspective. Lin provides guidance as to how governments should direct
the economy; he emphasizes that they should strive to shape the economy in a
way that is consistent with its comparative advantage. The problem is that some
of the most important elements of comparative advantage are endogenous.
Switzerland’s comparative advantage in watch-making has little to do with its
geography.
Standard Heckscher-Ohlin theory (emphasizing that trade in goods was a sub-
stitute for movement in factors) was formulated in a period before globalization
allowed the kinds of flows of capital that occur today. With fully mobile capital,
outside of agriculture, natural resource endowments need not provide the
basis for explaining patterns of production and specialization.2 In short, there
is no reason for countries to need to limit themselves to patterns dictated by
endowments, as conventionally defined. More important is the “endowment” of
knowledge and entrepreneurship. A major focus of policy should be on how to
enhance and shape those endowments.
Even if a government would like to avoid addressing these issues, it cannot; for
what the government does (or does not do) has consequences, positive and nega-
tive, for the development of the “learning society.” This is obviously so for invest-
ments in infrastructure, technology, and education; but also for financial, trade,
intellectual property rights and competition policies.
At the center of creating a learning society is the identifying of sectors that are
more amenable to learning, with benefits not captured by firms themselves, so
that there will be underinvestment in learning. Elsewhere Greenwald and I have
argued that an implication of this is the encouragement of the industrial sector,
which typically has large spillovers. This approach provides an interpretation of
the success of Asia’s export-led growth. Had Korea allowed market forces on their
own to prevail, it would not have embarked on its amazing development suc-
cesses. Static efficiency entailed that Korea produced rice; indeed the country
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might today have been among the most efficient rice farmers—but it would still
be a poor country. As Arrow pointed out (1962), one learns by doing (and one
learns how to learn by learning [Stiglitz 1987]).
This discussion highlights the fundamental difference with neoclassical
approaches emphasizing short-run efficiency. The fundamental trade-offs between
static and dynamic efficiency should be familiar from the debate over patent laws.
A major concern with these industrial policies3 concerns implementation—do
developing countries have the requisite capacities? We need to put this question
in context.
There is probably no country that has grown successfully without an impor-
tant role, not just in restraining and creating markets, but also in promoting such
industrial policies, from the countries of East Asia today to the advanced indus-
trial countries, not just during their developmental stages, but even today. The
task is to adopt policies and practices—to create institutions like an effective civil
service—that enhance the quality of the public sector. The successful countries
did so. Policies that either intentionally or unintentionally weaken the state are
not likely to do so.
Economic policies have to reflect the capacity of the state to implement them.
One of the arguments in favor of exchange rate policies that encourage export
industries is that they are broad based: the government does not have to pick par-
ticular “strategic” sectors to support. As always, there are trade-offs: efficiency
might be enhanced if the sectors with the largest externalities could be targeted.
There are other broad-based policies, such as a development-oriented intellec-
tual-property regime, and investment and financial policies that encourage trans-
fer of technology and the promotion of local entrepreneurship, that can help
promote a learning and innovation society (Hausman and Rodrik 2003; Stiglitz
2004; Emran and Stiglitz 2009; Hoff 2010). Some forms of financial and capital
market liberalization may be counterproductive.
Interventions will never be perfect, nor need they be to effect an improvement
in economic performance.4 The choice is not between an imperfect government
and a perfect market. It is between imperfect governments and imperfect markets,
each of which has to serve as a check on the other; they need to be seen as comp-
lementary, and we need to seek a balance between the two—a balance which is
not just a matter of assigning certain tasks to one, and others to the other, but
rather designing systems where they interact effectively.
While I have been discussing the economics of development, that subject cannot
be separated from broader aspects of societal transformation (Stiglitz 1998), as
Hirschman emphasized in his writings (1958, 1982). Race and caste are social
constructs that effectively inhibit the human development of large parts of the
population in many parts of the world. The study of how these constructs get
formed, and how they change, is thus a central part of developmental studies
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(Hoff and Stiglitz 2010). In this article, I have emphasized the creation of a learn-
ing society. The economics of doing so entails policies that change sectoral com-
position. But at the root of success is the education system and how it inculcates
attitudes toward change and skills of learning. Other policies (for example legal
systems, gender-based microcredit schemes, affirmative action programs) can also
play an important role.
Before concluding, I want to make two further remarks. The first concerns the
relationship between growth and poverty reduction. While growth may be necess-
ary for sustained poverty reduction, it is not sufficient. Not all development pol-
icies are pro-poor; some are anti-poor. Policies like financial and capital market
liberalization have, at least in some countries, contributed to greater instability,
and a consequence of that instability is more poverty.5 Contractionary monetary
and fiscal policies in response to crises exacerbate the downturns, leading to
higher unemployment and a higher incidence of poverty. Policies to promote a
learning economy too can either be pro- or anti-poor, but the most successful pol-
icies will necessarily be broad-based, engendering a transformation of the learning
capacities of all citizens, and will therefore be pro-poor.
The second comment relates to the broader objectives of development, which
should be sustainable improvements in the well-being of the citizens of the
country, and the metrics we use to assess success.6 Our metrics don’t typically
capture the increase in the wealth of a country that is a result of the learning
strategies advocated here. It is only gradually, over time, that the benefits are rea-
lized and recognized.
The aftermath of the global financial crisis should be an exciting time for
economists, including development economists, since it dramatically revealed
flaws in the reigning paradigm. This paradigm has had enormous influence in
development economics, though that influence was already waning, because its
prescriptions had failed. Fortunately there are alternative frameworks already
available—a plethora of ideas that should provide the basis for new understand-
ings of why a few countries have succeeded so well and some have failed so miser-
ably. Out of this understanding, perhaps we will be able to mold new policy
frameworks that will provide the basis of a new era of growth—growth that will
be both sustainable and enhance the well-being of most citizens in the poorest
countries of the world.
Notes
This article was originally a paper prepared for a World Bank symposium, based on Justin Yifu Lin’s
paper, “New Structural Economics.” The perspective taken here is based on joint work with Bruce
Greenwald (2006 forthcoming). I am indebted to Eamon Kirchen-Allen for research assistance.
1. Even before Solow, Schumpeter had argued that the strength of a market economy resided in
its ability to promote innovation and invention; and, shortly after Solow’s work, there developed a
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large literature on endogenous growth, associated with names like Arrow, Shell, Nordhaus,
Atkinson, Dasgupta, Uzawa, Kennedy, Fellner, and Stiglitz, followed on in the 1980s and 90s by the
work of Romer. (See for example Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1969; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980a and
1980b; Fellner, 1961; Kennedy, 1964; Nordhaus, 1969a and 1969b, Romer, 1994; Shell, 1966
and 1967; Uzawa, 1965.) The earlier work on endogenous (sometimes referred to as induced) inno-
vation addressed not only the rate of innovation but its direction. For a discussion of more recent
contributions in this line of research, see Stiglitz (2006).
2. Indeed, the work of Krugman has emphasized that today most trade is not related in fact to
differences in factor endowments.
3. I use the term broadly to embrace any policy attempting to affect the direction of the
economy.
4. Indeed, if all projects were successful, it suggests that the government is undertaking too little
risk.
5. As I have also noted, such policies may have an adverse effect in enhancing domestic learning
capacities.
6. The International Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social
Progress emphasized the failures of GDP to reflect either sustainability or well-being (Fitoussi, Sen,
and Stiglitz 2010). GDP per capita does not say anything about how well most citizens are doing; it
can be going up even though most citizens incomes are declining (as has been happening in the
United States). GDP focuses on production in the country, not on incomes earned by those in the
country, and takes no account of environmental degradation or resource depletion, or, more broadly,
of sustainability. The United States and Argentina both provide examples of countries whose growth
appeared to be good—but both were based on unsustainable debts, used to finance consumption
booms, not investment.
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